A Vision for a Secular Australia: Talk Notes

Notes for a debate I participated in at the University of Melbourne, 18 August 2016

Key principles

  • Begin from the premise that Australia is a liberal democracy, and should strive to best implement this form of governance
  • A liberal state does not enforce one vision of ‘the good life’ on its citizens, but which seeks to establish a free, fair, and cohesive society in which individuals can pursue their own vision of the good life, subject to the no harm principle
  • The state best achieves this aim when it takes no position on matters of faith or religion
  • A secular state is thus a state where the government abstains taking a side or conferring any advantages or disadvantages on the basis of religious belief, or lack thereof
  • Secularism is thus a position about the proper relationship between the government, including legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and its citizens and their religious practices (or lack thereof)

What secularism is not, or should not be

  • State atheism: enforced or promoted atheism is just as contrary to secularism as having a state religion
  • Opposition to Christianity: while in Australia a focus on Christianity is natural, secularists should be just as concerned about any efforts to privilege or disadvantage any other religious or irreligious belief
  • Total privatisation of religion: expression of faith can still be a public activity in a secular state. I’m not an advocate of the hardline French model of laicite, which I think is anti-liberal. Religion can be taught in the streets and promoted by public figures, be cannot be promoted or disadvantaged by the state
  • (Most controversially) separation of religion from politics: religion always has and always will have political dimensions, and secularists should not try to forbid or remove this. A liberal state needs to allow for freedom of exercise of political beliefs, including on religious grounds. Such beliefs, however, ought not have the effect of specifically benefiting or disadvantaging religious groups through government policy

Some policy applications, deriving from these principles

  1. No government-funded chaplains in schools
  2. No institutionalised prayers in parliament
  3. No special provision for SRI in public schools
  4. ‘Advancement of religion’ not considered a charitable purpose
  5. No special religious exemptions from anti-discrimination laws
  6. No government preference for funding to religious charities or social institutions
  7. Government standards of service applicable to all government-funded institutions, with no special religious exemptions (in particular, access to reproductive services provided by all government funded medical centres, provision of age appropriate sex education at all government funded schools)

Why Christians should endorse Secularism

  • History of Christian persecution by authorities:
    • Persecution of Christians under the Roman Empire
    • Persecution of those attempting to translate the bible into vernacular
    • Corruption and abuse associated with mixing of religious office and political power
    • Persecution of Protestant reformers
    • Persecution of dissenters and other Protestant minorities
  • Religious freedom was in large part invented by Christian minorities wanting religious freedom. Atheists and agnostics likewise have a long history of persecution for their beliefs. It is precisely because of this shared history that we should join together in support of a secular Australia

Islamic Contributions to Scholarship

School students the world over regularly experience all the pain and pleasures of learning algebra. What few students realise, however, is how much they have to thank medieval Islamic scholars for the development of the ideas they are learning. The word ‘algebra’ derives from the Arabic al-jabr, which means roughly ‘restoration’ or ‘rejoining’. It was developed by ninth century Persian mathematician Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Khwārizmī in his most impressively entitled The Compendious Book on Calculation by Completion and Balancing. Al-Khwārizmī also gave his name to the world ‘algorithm’, referring to the method he developed of solving mathematical problems by systematic application of particular abstract rules – the very rules that students learn to this day in elementary algebra courses.  Students also have medieval Islamic scholars to thank for the numerals they use in calculations (1,2,3, etc), which were originally developed in India and then passed on to the West by Islamic mathematicians. Although modern students might perhaps feel less than grateful for this contribution, anyone who has ever attempted to do arithmetic using Roman numerals (the preferred method in the west before the adoption of Arabic numerals) will understand how much of an advance they represent.

The contributions of Medieval Islamic scholars to human knowledge extend well beyond algebra, encompassing a wide range of fields such as mathematics, philosophy, medicine, and astronomy. The modern scientific discipline of chemistry evolved from medieval alchemy, and the English word ‘alchemy’ derives from the Arabic al-kīmīā. Such a word borrowing is due in large part to the influence of such scholars as Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi (‘the Persian Socrates’) and Jabir ibn Hayyan, both of whom purified a wide range of chemical substances, and whose works describe in detail various chemical apparatuses, some of which are still in use to this day. In the field of astronomy, Syrian astronomer and mathematician Al-Battani calculated the length of the solar year to within an accuracy of two minutes, his work later being influential to Tycho Brahe and Nicolaus Copernicus in the development of heliocentrism. The tenth century Basran scientist and philosopher Hasan Ibn al-Haytham was so profoundly influential that he has been called ‘the second Ptolemy’. He wrote numerous influential works on optics, astronomy, and geometry, and was an early proponent of what we would now describe as the ‘scientific method’, including the use of empirical observations and mathematical models to understand natural laws. Ibn Sina, like many contemporary Islamic thinkers, made contributions to many fields, but is perhaps most well known for his monumental medical encyclopaedia The Canon of Medicine, which was used as a medical text throughout the Islamic world and in Europe until as late as the seventeenth century. Islamic scholars also made important advances in the field of geography, such as the notable work of twelfth century geographer Muhammad al-Idrisi. He produced a fascinating work called ‘the Book of Roger’ (after the Norman patron who commissioned the work), which discussed in detail the physical geography and social and political customs of all lands and peoples of the known word, from Western Europe across to East Asia. Al-Idrisi produced a world map which remained one of the most accurate in existence for centuries, until the voyages of discovery of the fifteenth century.

Most of the developments discussed above, and many others besides, took place during a period often referred to as the ‘Islamic Golden Age’, which lasted from roughly the eight through to the thirteenth centuries. Understanding why the Islamic world flourished during this period, and how influential their contributions were to prove to Europe, requires some knowledge of the historical context in which these developments occurred. To appreciate this story, we must journey all the way back to the fifth century AD, in the dying days of the Roman Empire. As the western portion of the empire progressively decayed and collapsed under the combined assault of barbarian attacks and internal unrest, economic and cultural life became increasingly disrupted. The gradual collapse of central administration meant that the famed Roman roads, so vital for connecting together disparate regions of the Empire, fell into disrepair. Local townships and petty lords took over the provision of security at a local level, hampering commerce and cultural exchange between regions. With the economic and political decline came a reduction in the degree of urbanisation, falling literacy levels, sharply decreased manuscript production, and an overall reduction in the resources available and interest in the pursuit of science of philosophy.Such a comparable decline, however, did not occur in the eastern regions of the Empire, and it was these relatively wealthy regions, still preserving much of the learning of the ancient world, which came under Islamic rule beginning in the seventh century. The period of relative order, prosperity, and unity that the Islamic world from Persia to Spain experienced in the following centuries helped to foster the bourgeoning of Islamic science, philosophy, and culture. Islamic achievements of this period therefore far outstripped anything taking place in contemporary Europe, which by comparison was economically backward and hopelessly fragmented into numerous feudal principalities.

Beginning around the eleventh century, increased economic and cultural exchanges between Western Europe and the Islamic world (largely taking place through Spain and Sicily), led to a transferal of many texts, ideas, and technologies to the West. Of particular interest to Europeans were the Arabic translations of many classical Greek writers, relatively few of which had been preserved when knowledge of Greek had been lost in the west in the aftermath of the fall of the Western Roman Empire. As more of these texts were translated into Latin (the universal language of scholarship in the west), many of these texts became available to European scholars for the first time in centuries. Particularly important as the so-called ‘rediscovery’ of the works of Aristotle, which although preserved in the East had largely been lost to the West, and the translation of which into Latin resulted in a wide range of philosophical and theological upheavals, notably influencing the work of leading medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas.

Today, many scholars believe that the contributions of medieval Islamic science, philosophy, and mathematics to Western Europe, as well as its important role in preserving ancient Greek texts, helped to foster first the Renaissance and later the rise of modern scientific thinking in early modern Europe. In particular, the rediscovery and reimagining of many works of literature and philosophy of classical Greece and Rome that characterised the period would likely have not been possible had these works not been preserved in the Islamic world. It is unfortunate that today, with the central nexus of scientific and philosophical work now having shifted elsewhere, so few remember the vital contributions of the Islamic world at a time when Western Europe, by comparison, produced very little of scientific or philosophical value.

The Failures of New Atheism

Introduction

As for social and intellectual movement, the term ‘New Atheism’ is a diverse and contested notion, potentially encompassing a wide diversity of positions and ways of thinking. My subsequent discussion of the differences between ‘New Atheism’ and ‘Old Atheism’, therefore, should be understood as explicating general tendencies, rather than presenting an absolute binary dichotomy. This caveat being made, however, I believe that the New Atheist movement does exhibit sufficient regularities and commonalities for us to make some tentative general observations.

In contrast to Old Atheism, by which I mean atheism as it existed roughly prior to the turn of the Millennium, New Atheism has tended to be much more assertive in the public discourse, much more eager and willing to make its views heard, and much less concerned about respecting the religious beliefs or faith of others. New Atheism also has tended to focus, to an even greater degree than did Old Atheism, on the social and political harms of religion, especially fundamentalist religion. New Atheism has also placed a much greater emphasis on creating a sustained mass movement, and of developing a socially and politically engaged atheism. All three of these trends are themselves worthy of much deeper analysis, however in this article I want to focus on a fourth major trend that I observe in New Atheism, one which I find to be a much less positive development. Simply put, I believe that New Atheism represents an intellectual retrogression from Old Atheism, doing away with the sophisticated philosophical positions of old, and replacing them with a crude form of scientism and general disinterest in rigorous philosophy. In this essay, I will argue that this trend represents a profoundly negative development in the history of atheistic thought, and puts atheists and rationalists in a poor position to counter increasingly sophisticated apologetic arguments.

Atheism: Old and New

New Atheism is undoubtedly a movement thoroughly infused by scientists and the scientifically minded. Beginning with the canonical ‘four horseman’, we find that Richard Dawkins is a biologist, Sam Harris a neuroscientist, and Christopher Hitchens a journalist. Daniel Dennett is the only professional philosopher of the four, though he too represents a particular strain of highly scientifically-minded philosophical thought, and is not himself a specialist in philosophy of religion. Other prominent figures associated to varying degrees with new Atheism include Victor Stenger (physicist), Laurence Krauss (physicist), Jerry Coyne (biologist), PZ Meyers (biologist), AC Grayling (philosopher), Michel Onfray (philosopher), Dan Barker (former pastor), Michael Shermer (historian of science), Bill Nye (biologist), and Neil degrasse Tyson (physicist). Though this list is hardly comprehensive, it is I think representative of the strong (though not exclusive) domination of New Atheism by scientists, particularly biologists and physicists.

This preponderance of scientists in the New Atheism contrasts greatly with the much larger proportion of prominent philosophers among Old Atheists. Key atheist figures from the twentieth century include Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean Paul-Sartre, Sigmund Freud, Bertrand Russell, Anthony Flew, Michael Martin, John Mackie, and Richard Rorty. All of these figures, with the possible exception of Freud, were notable philosophers who provided robust and challenging arguments against religion. Such thinkers, as I have indicated, are much less preponderant among the New Atheists. Indeed, a number of New Atheists or allied thinkers, such as Dawkins, Krauss, and Tyson, have publically expressed their disinterest and indeed active distain of philosophy in general, or philosophy of religion in particular. From their public remarks, many New Atheist thinkers and their supporters seem to endorse some form of scientism, a view (not widely accepted even by scientifically-minded philosophers) which asserts in essence that science is the only legitimate way of acquiring knowledge about the world. New Atheism has largely turned its back on serious philosophy, embracing science as the queen of all human knowledge.

The Christian Resurgence

Contrasting sharply with the New Atheist turn away from philosophy, since roughly the late 1960s there has been a surprising resurgence of theism in general, and conservative Christianity in particular, within the Anglo-American philosophical world. This resurgence has been manifested in several ways, including the publication of a series of highly influential works by thinkers such as Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, Robert Adams, and William Lane Craig. Supporting this burgeoning Christian scholarship have been two academic societies, the Evangelical Philosophical Society was (founded in 1977), and the Society of Christian Philosophers (established 1978). Both these societies have their own peer-reviewed academic journals, respectively Philosophia Christi and Faith and Philosophy, which regularly publish articles relating to Christian theology, philosophy, and apologetics.

This resurgence of conservative Christianity with the academy has been mirrored by the rise in popular evangelical apologetics. A simple Google search reveals a positive cornucopia apologetic ministries and organisations: The Christian Apologetics & Research Ministry (founded 1995), Creation Ministries International (founded 1977), The Christian Apologetics Alliance (established 2011), Reasonable Faith (founded 2008), and Cold-Case Christianity (founded 2013) are just a few representative examples. Many of these groups and thinkers are financed and publicised by evangelical Christian universities such as Biola University, Denver Seminary, Westminster Theological Seminary, and Southern Evangelical Seminary, all of which also over masters degrees in apologetics. Needless to say, organised atheism lacks anything like this degree of institutional support.

This new brand of evangelical apologetics bears little resemblance to the uneducated, scientifically illiterate caricature that New Atheists frequently present of theists. On the contrary, many of these Christian thinkers utilise a wide range of cutting-edge discoveries and concepts from both philosophy and the sciences. In his Kalam Cosmological and Fine Tuning Arguments, for example, William Lane Craig synthesises old philosophical arguments with new scientific discoveries and ideas such as the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem, Boltzmann branes, and quantum cosmology. Alvin Plantinga has constructed a sophisticated and much-discussed version of the Ontological argument using modal logic, and has also built upon recent work in reliabilist epistemology to develop a careful argument defending belief in God as properly basic. Richard Swinburne has used principles of inductive logic and bayesian inference to argue for the Resurrection of Jesus. Director of the National Institutes of Health Francis Collins has argued on the basis of modern findings in biology and neuroscience for the compatibility of Christianity with evolutionary biology.

New Atheism’s Intellectual Shortcomings

What do the New Atheists have to say in response to this rising tide of increasingly sophisticated and well-resourced evangelical apologetics? With a few exceptions, such as the excellent writings of Dawkins and PZ Meyers against creationism, and the work of Stenger critiquing the Fine Tuning argument, on the whole the answer seems to be relatively little. One searches in vain through the writings of Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, and others for detailed, careful examination of the apologetic arguments raised by Plantinga, Swinburne, Craig, and others. Indeed, as I noted above, generally New Atheist thinkers express considerable distain for philosophy of religion, and evince little or no interest in presenting carefully-crafted responses to apologetic arguments. A related severe shortcoming of the New Atheist movement is its predilection towards outmoded scientistic approaches to philosophy, harkening back (though generally without attribution) to the early-twentieth century Vienna School in holding that claims which are not scientifically or empirically verifiable or testable are meaningless and not even worth discussing.

The New Atheist movement is also particularly poor at advancing any positive arguments in favour of atheism as a worldview. A common approach is to mock religion for its many absurdities, denounce its many negative social and political consequences, and then make various self-aggrandising statements to the effect that modern scientific discoveries in biology, physics, neuroscience, etc, have made theism obsolete and indefensible. The multifarious epistemological, ontological, ethical, and other assumptions which underpin such beliefs are rarely addressed, and almost never with reference to contemporary literature on the subject.

There are a number of atheist philosophers who have produced sophisticated, thoughtful responses to Christian apologetic arguments, including Kai Neilsen, Theodore Drange, Quentin Smith, Graham Oppy, and Michael Ruse. Such thinkers, however, have substantially lower profiles than either their New Atheist or Christian apologist counterparts, and also typically have not been much associated with the New Atheism movement. Indeed, Michael Ruse has been highly critical of New Atheism, describing it as ‘a bloody disaster’. Similar views have been echoed by other philosophers, for example in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, it is remarked that ‘New Atheists are largely seen as bush-league by professional philosophers of religion’.

My assessment of New Atheism as a movement, therefore, is that it represents a shift in atheist thinking away from the philosopher and towards the scientist, and consequently has led to a relative decline in the intellectual standing of atheism as a worldview. Indeed, whilst New Atheism has been successful in raising the profile of non-belief and in drawing greater attention to the harm and injustice perpetrated in the name of religion (both noble pursuits to be sure), I believe it has failed in its endeavour to provide a rigorous, carefully constructed, philosophically defensible account of the world around us and our place within it.

Why it Matters

Why should we, as rationalists and critical-thinkers, care about these developments? I think there are several reasons. First, as freethinkers we have an obligation to the pursuit of truth through examination of the best available evidence, careful argumentation, and critical analysis of reasons given for different beliefs. It reflects very poorly upon our position if we continue to repeat the slogan ‘there is no evidence for the existence of God’, whilst turning a blind eye to the many rigorous, carefully-development arguments that have been and continue to be advanced by Christian apologists and theistic philosophers.

Second, inquiring minds who seek out the best evidence and arguments increasingly are encountering the writings of Christian apologists and philosophers, and then searching in vain for persuasive responses in the New Atheist literature. This leads some, I suspect non-trivial, number of people to either adopt or maintain strong evangelical convictions. This is of concern to me because it represents, particularly in the case of young thinkers, a diversion of talent and intellect away from potentially more productive endeavours such as science or humanist causes, towards Christian apologetics programs, theology, or Christian ministry. To me it is a tragedy that even a single person would devote their life in pursuit of a false set of beliefs, let alone that this may happen in part as a result of the failure of New Atheists to provide clear and robust refutations of apologetics material. A corollary of this is that atheists themselves might also be concerned about holding false beliefs, particularly if they cannot provide adequate responses to apologetic arguments.

Third, the prestige and influence of any intellectual movement is, in the long run, substantially affected by its ability to add to the store of human knowledge, and to produce new and insightful ways of understanding the world. For the most part the New Atheists, (in disturbing contrast to the new apologists), have failed to do this, and I believe it is partly as a result of this failure that their influence in intellectual circles is waning, and will continue to wane unless the movement substantially lifts its intellectual game.

All of my criticisms of New Atheism would not be so much of a concern if this represented but one among many competing brands of atheistic belief, since if New Atheism proved not up to the challenge of providing rigorous philosophical responses to the new apologetics, other approaches to atheism could fill its place and step up to the intellectual mantle. Unfortunately, given the relatively small monetary and organisational resources of atheist, freethought, and humanist groups (certainly in comparison to the many incredibly well financed Christian churches and universities), it seems that there is not really room for more than one significant ‘brand’ of atheism. New Atheism seems to have ‘crowded out’ other approaches to atheism, at least in the popular consciousness and discourse. Consequently if New Atheism fails to present a philosophically rigorous and persuasive response to the new apologists, this will be taken to represent a failure of atheism or freethought as a whole to provide such a response. To avert this deeply concerning outcome, we as rationalists, freethinkers, skeptics, and atheists, must learn to better combine the New Atheist passion not to be silenced with the Old Atheist respect for careful philosophical argumentation. Anything less represents, in my view, an abdication of our intellectual and social responsibilities.

Sources

Craig, William Lane. “Does God Exist?” Philosophy Now (2013).

Dougherty, Trent, and Logal Paul Gage. “New Atheist Approaches to Religion.” In The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, edited by Graham Oppy, 2015.

Ruse, Michael. “Why I Think the New Atheists Are a Bloody Disaster.” Science and the Sacred (2009).

Taylor, James E. “The New Atheists.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015).

The Concept of ‘Freedom of Speech’

Introduction

What is freedom of speech? Most people agree that free speech is something we should uphold, but there is widespread and apparently increasing disagreement about the meaning and applicability of the concept. In this article I will not seek to provide a definitive answer to this complex question. Instead, I shall confine myself to an analysis of some of the key issues that are relevant to the debate, with a particular focus on highlighting certain concepts and distinctions, a proper understanding of which I think would greatly further the public discussion about this important topic.

‘Unlimited’ free speech

Let us first consider the phrase ‘freedom of speech’. There are two important terms here that require discussion: ‘freedom’ and ‘speech’. In this context ‘speech’ is typically understood in quite a broad sense, incorporating a wide range of methods for conveying a message. Speech is therefore not limited merely to verbal communication but includes distributing written texts, displaying photographs, producing motion pictures, and even symbolic acts such as flag burning or holding a political rally. Regarding ‘freedom’, in political philosophy a distinction is sometimes drawn between the freedom to achieve some end or undertake some action (‘freedom to’), and the freedom from being restricted or interfered with in some way (‘freedom from’). While in some cases it can be unclear as to which type of freedom is meant, or even how exactly to distinguish between the two, in the case of freedom of speech it seems fairly clear that what is meant is ‘freedom from’ and not ‘freedom to’. Nobody thinks that by ‘freedom of speech’ what is meant is that we should have the right or ability to achieve whatever goals we might have for our speech, or that others must listen to or agree with our speech. There is no positive right for our speech to do anything or have any particular effect, so long as we are able to propagate our message in a manner such that people at least have the opportunity to hear it. Thus it seems clear that the usage of ‘freedom’ in the concept ‘freedom of speech’ should be understood primarily in the negative sense, of the freedom from being interfered with or restricted.

If to have freedom of speech is to be able to speak without some kind of restriction or interference, then what sort of restriction or interference would constitute a violation of this freedom? Some people hold the view that any restriction or limitation on speech of any form constitutes a violation of freedom of speech; however this absolute or ‘unlimited’ form of free speech is simply incoherent. Asking people to speak only one at a time in a group discussion, and requiring those who violate this rule by interrupting or speaking over others to either cease talking or leave, does not in any meaningful sense constitute a restriction of ‘freedom of speech’, since allowing the interruption to continue would be to restrict the speech of the original speaker. Unless we wish to say that the ultimate incarnation of free speech is everybody yelling at once and nobody able to listen, we must accept that at a minimum certain limitations and restrictions of speech are necessary in order to ensure that talks, discussions, and other forms of communication can occur in an orderly and intelligible manner. Ejecting hecklers who are actively disrupting a talk or discussion, therefore, does not constitute suppression of free speech.

Harm and hate speech

When considering what sort of restriction would genuinely constitute a limitation to the exercise of free speech, we are faced with two main questions: what type of restrictions do we think are legitimate or appropriate, and what sorts of speech should they be applied to? To consider the second question first, John Stuart Mill famously defended the harm principle, according to which the only justifiable reason for restricting freedom of speech is in order to prevent harm to others. In this context, harm is usually understood to mean relatively direct harm, resulting in damage to person or property, or the clear violation of somebody’s rights. Thus, incitements to violence, threats, blackmail, libel, fraud, revealing state secrets, and blatantly false advertising would typically be regarded as examples where speech does clear and direct harm, and thus can justifiably be restricted under the harm principle. There is, of course, disagreement as exactly how to understand the notion of ‘harm’, and how broadly or narrowly it should be construed. Certainly not any type of harm is sufficient – for instance, if my (non-libellous) speech causes a business to lose sales or a political candidate to lose votes, this does not constitute a reason for restricting my speech because the harm is not the result of any damage to life or property or infringement of rights. The harm is not a direct consequence of my speech, but rather a by-product of other people’s reasonable and quite legal responses to the information or arguments I have provided them. Though the business or political may be worse off, they have not been ‘harmed’ in the sense meant by Mills, and thus there is no case for restricting my speech.

Some have argued that the ‘no harm’ principle does not go far enough in identifying the range of cases in which restriction of freedom of speech is justified. Hate speech is a particularly controversial example of a type of speech which many think should be restricted even if it does not cause harm in the narrow sense envisioned by Mill and his supporters. Traditionally, defenders of free speech have argued that whether or not speech is offensive or even intimidating is highly subjective and indirect, and thus is not a sufficiently clear or direct form of harm to justify restricting free speech. On the other hand, supporters of restricting hate speech typically contend that vilification or demonization of particular groups of people is contradictory to the fundamental principles of a free, democratic society, under which the basic equality of all persons is a fundamental precept. As such, hate speech has no place in such societies and no legitimate basis for legal protection. Defenders of this view also argue that the marginalisation produced by hate speech can have profound social and psychological effects on those it targets, which while perhaps not being as direct or tangible as Mill would have liked, nevertheless constitute very real and important forms of harm which should be included when determining what sorts of speech to restrict. An example often cited is the obviously chilling effect and implied threats entailed by a planned Neo-Nazi march through the predominantly Jewish neighbourhood of Skokie in 1977. Speech that discriminates and denigrates, particularly with respect to minority groups, is thus not considered to be the sort of speech which warrants any particular protection. A significant dispute concerning the extent of free speech concerns how much importance should be given to what may be called ‘psychological harm’, or forms of harm that are not tangible but may nevertheless be real in their negative effects.

In my view, one of the biggest problems with the dispute concerning the status of hate speech is that the concept is poorly defined. Very rarely will anyone directly characterise their own position or speech (mere graffiti aside) as directing hatred towards others, and so using explicit appeals to hatred will not be particularly useful. What to one person is hate speech directed against a vulnerable minority, is to another person simply an expression of some viewpoint that other people find offensive or upsetting. As such, ‘hate speech’ cannot usually be identified simply by the use of blatant statements of animosity, but requires detailed analysis of the content of the speech in question. Such analysis, however, seems to be impossible to perform in any objective way, and effectively seems to amount to making judgements as to how disagreeable or offensive the given speech was. Use of the label ‘hate speech’ also fails to adequately consider other factors pertinent to the question of whether particular speech is acceptable or not, including the context in which it occurs, how easy it is to avoid the objectionable speech, and the social value of the speech. An academic book making claims that some regard as hate speech, for example, is (at least potentially) more socially valuable and certainly easier to avoid in comparison to public posters displaying racial slurs. While both of these instances of speech may arguably count as hate speech, it is not clear that the same restrictions would be appropriate in each case, and thus the use of the single label potentially obfuscates more than it clarifies. Furthermore, many arguments in favour of restricting hate speech implicitly appeal to various strengthened forms of the harm principle, for example by considering psychological as well as physical harm. As such it may be more helpful to simply phrase the debate in terms of what sorts of harms are considered to be sufficient to warrant restriction of free speech, and contrast such harms with factors such as how easy the speech is to avoid and how plausible the speech is to have some form of social benefit, thereby side-stepping the thorny issue of whether given speech is hateful. This would potentially help to clarify genuine points of disagreement and avoid confusion over ill-defined terms like ‘hate speech’.

Censorship vs no-platforming

Another point of dispute concerning the freedom of speech relates to what forms of restrictions are appropriate and who should implement these restrictions. In recent years many universities and other public venues have been criticised for engaging in ‘no-platforming’ policies whereby particular people are banned or disinvited from delivering talks or participating in conferences, on the basis of remarks they have made which are deemed to be unacceptable or inappropriate. Some observers have condemned this practise as a violation of freedom of speech, while others defend the practise on the basis that freedom of speech is only concerned with government restrictions on speech. On the one hand, there is a clear difference between exercising of government censorship to prevent people from engaging in certain types of speech, and a private entity such as a company or university refusing to host someone espousing a particular point of view. Newspapers, publishers, venues, and websites all have the right to utilise their property and influence as they wish, and it is unreasonable to require them to host points of view which they do not wish to provide a voice to or find morally objectionable. On the other hand, as Mill pointed out, the influence of social pressure and disapprobrium can sometimes be a very powerful means of shutting down legitimate discussion and suppressing or marginalising minority points of view. Furthermore, an abstract right to freedom of speech does little good if one cannot find a venue to speak or printer to publish one’s ideas. If we think that freedom of speech is in general something that is valuable, therefore, it seems reasonable that we would regard both private and government restrictions on such freedom as at least potentially worthy of concern. It does not follow, of course, that we should have the same standards or criteria for determining the circumstances in which it is appropriate for each party to infringe on such freedoms. We may, for instance, think it inappropriate for a university to refuse to host a speaker merely because they disagree with the stance of that speaker and find his views objectionable. However, if that same speaker has engaged in discriminatory and demeaning speech directed at certain minority groups, we may think it justified for the same university to refuse them a platform, even if we do not regard the harm done by this speech as sufficient or direct enough to warrant government restriction of that speech.

A final point to be raised is that merely because some type of speech should not be restricted by the government does not entail that such speech should be free from all negative consequences. In particular, one may regard certain forms of speech as highly offensive, immoral, incorrect, or otherwise inappropriate, and may thus denounce them in the strongest possible manner, without advocating that such speech should be made illegal. The key distinction here is between believing that people should legally be allowed to say something, and believing that they should say that thing. One may believe that someone should have the right to say something, even if one does not think it is right for them to say that thing. This distinction tends to be missed in at least two distinct ways. One the one side, some people conflate allowing certain speech with endorsing the content of that speech, which is fallacious since merely refraining from making something legally punishable is not equivalent to endorsing that activity. On the other side, some people seem to think that any strong criticism of particular speech, or any injunction that some things should not be said, is equivalent to advocating elimination of freedom of speech. This is also fallacious, since believing that something should not be illegal does not mean that one cannot simultaneously denounce that thing as wrong and attempt to persuade people not to do it. We widely recognise, for example, that lying is generally wrong even though (outside of certain contexts) it is not illegal to do so, nor would many people think it should in general be made illegal. This distinction between debates about what should be legal or illegal on the one hand, and debates about what is right or wrong on the other, must be properly understood if we are to make progress in debates surrounding freedom of speech.

Conclusion

Overall, it seems to me that the debate about freedom of speech will be assisted by greater clarity of core concepts and issues under dispute, such as the difference between morality and legality, and also by a greater willingness to recognise the importance of nuance and considering the various circumstances surrounding a particular act of speech. Dogmatic assertion of the absolute right of free speech on the one side, and unclarified use of vague terms such as ‘hate speech’ on the other side, can both be unhelpful in achieving a workable compromise regarding what types of speech should be restricted under which situations using which particular methods.

References

Victoria Bekiempis, “Why the ACLU is right to represent the Ku Klux Klan”, The Guardian (2012), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/29/aclu-right-represent-ku-klux-klan

Sean Faye, “If you don’t like no-platforming, maybe it’s you who’s the ‘special snowflake’”, Independent (2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/if-you-dont-like-no-platforming-maybe-its-you-whos-the-special-snowflake-a6884026.html

David van Mill, “Freedom of Speech”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/freedom-speech/

Reflections on ‘Why I am not an Atheist’

Introduction

Recently I went along to an event entitled ‘Why I am not an atheist’, in which Scottish pastor and Christian apologist David Robertson answered questions outlining his answer to this question. Here I just want to respond to some of his remarks and record my reflections on the event. Overall I thought the evening was pleasant. It is always interesting to hear other people’s ‘worldview stories’, and I appreciated that Robertson emphasised at some points that he wasn’t making an assertion about what everyone should believe, but just outlining his reasons and thought processes about the various issues raised. I found this approach refreshing, and glad he did not pursue the approach that some apologists take of throwing out dozens of reasons which are supposed to be convincing to all those who hear and properly understand them. That being said, there were a number of things that grated at me about his remarks over the course of the evening. Here I want to discuss a few of them in turn. Since most of the words of this essay focus on criticisms, it is easy to infer that I disliked the evening or thought all Robertson’s remarks were rubbish. That isn’t the case – I am glad to have attended and glad these events can take place. However, since I value discourse and interchange of perspectives, I think its appropriate for me to focus on discussing the points of disagreement.

Critiques of Focus and Tone

Let me first begin by expressing my frustration at Robertson’s almost obsessive focus on New Atheism. This was manifested in his continual referencing of the works and sayings of various New Atheist writers, predominantly Richard Dawkins, but also people like Laurence Krauss and Steven Hawking. Granted there was some discussion of Bertrand Russell, largely in response to a few questions from the moderator, but overall the focus was overwhelmingly on the New Atheists. To some extent this is understandable, as these figures have certainly been the highest profile atheists of recent years and still attract a great deal of public attention. However, as many other prominent atheist scholars themselves have noted, New Atheism is also an extremely intellectually shaky version of atheism, at least when it comes to actually engaging with tricky philosophical issues. I think New Atheism has some valid political/social points to make, but beyond that it has little of value to add to the discussion. In particular, as I have said many times before, New Atheist arguments as to why one should not believe in God or why all religions are false, are almost universally crap. They just aren’t well thought-out, carefully developed arguments. If one is going to seriously consider atheism, I think its important to consider and respond to the writings of respected, contemporary atheist philosophers who write on relevant subjects, such as Graham Oppy, Quentin Smith, Michael Ruse, Jordan Sobel, and J.L Mackie (the latter two being deceased but much more recent than Russell). Such people basically never get a mention by Christian apologists in these sorts of talks, and this event was no exception. It is for this reason that I expressed to Rob Martin afterwards, perhaps 70% seriously, that we should think about doing an event on atheism in which all discussion of New Atheism and the works of New Atheists was banned. I think this would actually do a lot to advance the discussion.

Another thing that I found detracted from the evening was Robertson’s occasional tendency to be quite dismissive towards atheists, and to disregard their arguments or views with little serious thought. This is probably directly related to the first point, that most of his interaction has probably been with New Atheist thinkers or ‘fans’ (he did explicitly mention spending a lot of time on the Richard Dawkins forums so I think this is a safe assumption). In my experience, the arguments presented by such people to defend their atheism philosophically are quite weak, and often show profound lack of ignorance of pertinent philosophy, history, or science. As such, a degree of frustration and annoyance on Robertson’s part is understandable. Nevertheless, particularly in the context of the topic of the evening, I felt that some of his remarks were in very poor taste. With regard to the problem of evil, an issue that has been debated for centuries and continues to be the subject of much serious philosophical discussion, Robertson said “I think the problem of evil turns middle class liberals away from God because its a nice excuse”. To me, a flippant remark like this is up there with ‘people just believe in God because they like the idea of an afterlife’, as a mean-spirited just-so story by which one avoids having to seriously think or engage with disagreeable viewpoints. Is it really plausible that the problem of evil is not at all a serious intellectual/spiritual/emotional problem? I know Robertson didn’t exactly say that, but it sure sounds like that’s what he meant. When I hear a Christian apologist say something like that, I’m basically ready to end the discussion, because it seems clear they are not the slightest bit interested in what I actually think or why I think it, but will just dismiss anything I say as me making ‘an excuse’. I do hope this isn’t actually the case for Robertson, but this remark in particular (as well as a few other more minor ones) rather put me on the defensive for the rest of the event.

Critiques of Arguments

There were times in the evening when I felt that Robertson was not doing justice to the atheist arguments or positions he responded to. One particularly bizarre example which (to be honest) still confuses me, I will relate below. Robertson was responding to Russell’s claim that the theist cannot give any sensible answer to the question ‘who created God?’ He said that this is an “intellectually vacuous question”, and remarked (apparently only half joking) that if his twelve year old daughter could not have easily come up with a response to this, then he would have disowned her. Robertson’s own response was that theists have never claimed that God is a created being, and so asking who created him is a completely irrelevant and moot question. Now I don’t know if Robertson is being fair to Russell’s argument here, and honestly I don’t really care, as this argument itself is not what interests me. Rather my purpose is to compare Robertson’s response to this argument to a different argument that he presented a bit later in the evening. With respect to ethics, human rights, and equality, Robertson claimed that “you cannot argue that all human beings are equal if your whole basis is naturalistic materialism because obviously we are not”. He then gave an example of what he meant, saying: “I’m not equal to Brad Pitt in looks, or Usain Bolt in speed, or Steven Hawking in intelligence, etc.” It seems perfectly obvious, however, that when we are talking about all people being equal in this context, we do not mean that they are equal in every ability, or in every type of ranking we could devise. The idea is rather something like that every person is deserving of equal basic respect, or has equal human rights, or is of equal moral value, or something along these lines. Obviously there is a discussion to be had about what exactly we do mean by this sort of claim, but Robertson’s comparisons are clearly irrelevant, since no one is claiming the sorts of equalities that he mentions. I really find it hard to fathom how Robertson can be so dismissive of the ‘who created God’ argument on the one hand, while a few minutes later himself making such an absurdly weak and misconstrued argument.

There were a few times during the evening when Robertson made assertions that I thought were very dubious and should not have been stated in the bold, confident way there were without at least providing some further explanation, evidence, or qualifications. I will cite a few key examples. In response to some of the claims of New Atheists he stated ‘‘there’s lots of things that science can never explain because science by definition is not able to explain them”. Now I don’t know whether I agree with this statement or not, primarily because I have no idea what ‘definition’ of science he is talking about. He didn’t provide one, nor refer to any of the many competing theories and accounts of what constitutes ‘science’ that have been discussed in the literature. There is simply no such thing  as ‘the definition of science’, and thus no way to make any sense of what he’s talking about here. In a second example, Robertson claimed that “there has never been a human society ever where people did not believe in some sort of God.” Once again, I don’t know whether I agree with him or not because I don’t know what he means by ‘some sort of God’. If he means ‘any sort of supernatural being’, then I would probably agree with this statement, though defining it so broadly blunts the force of this claim rather a lot. If instead we interpret ‘God’ to be something at least moderately close to an all-powerful personal creator being that Christianity believes in, then I think his statement is clearly false. Two obvious counterexamples are Buddhist societies, and the many animistic religious traditions which worship nature-spirits, without necessarily having any concept of a supreme being over and beyond nature. There’s obviously much to examine here concerning conceptions of God and comparative anthropology of religion, and that may well go beyond what he wanted to convey, but I don’t think that justifies such a careless sweeping statement. I expect that somebody who spends much of their time writing and speaking about such things to be more precise in their statements and not make such bold, dubious, unqualified claims as this.

I now turn to a couple of the two major substantive reasons that Robertson gave for why he isn’t an atheist. He first mentioned that he didn’t think atheism could make any sense because “there’s no way that all this (nature/the world) is an accident”. I would have liked him to expand a bit more on exactly what he meant by this statement. At other times over the course of the evening he mentioned the origin of life, the origin of the universe itself, and cosmic fine-tuning, but none of these were ever really expanded upon or fleshed out, so it’s difficult to really evaluate what sort of argument he would want to advance. One thing that I did want to mention is that he appealed to the idea that nature/life/the universe clearly looks as if it were designed by an intelligence, and that therefore it is reasonable to infer that (more probably than not) it actually was. I actually think that in essence this is a perfectly valid argument – I just disagree with the crucial premise that the world looks as if it were designed by an intelligence. Robertson mentioned Dawkins and Hawking as saying something along the lines that they agree the world looks as if it were designed, however I’m not sure what this is supposed to demonstrate. So what if they do think that – does that mean that it must be right? The issue is what reasons we have for thinking that the world/the universe look designed. I don’t think one can simply side-step the issue by asserting that some of the staunchest advocates of atheism concede the point.

Before leaving this issue there’s one further clarification I’d like to make, which may perhaps relate to the Dawkins et al quotes about design. This is to say that just because human minds are such that we have a strong tendency to make certain judgements or ascriptions doesn’t mean that such judgments are actually the most justified when all the evidence is properly considered. To give an example, to many people the famous ‘face on Mars’ really does look like a face that some agency constructed there. We are so well adapted to seeing faces that we make this ascription so readily, even of a blotch of blurry shadows on rocks. Of course, there is ample evidence, including multiple high-resolution images of the site in question, that there is no face there. And yet, to many people (including myself!) it still looks like there is a face on Mars! My point here is that something can ‘look like’ it is the case without it following that, when all evidence is properly considered, that is actually the best explanation for the phenomenon. Thus when people like Dawkins say that nature ‘looks designed’, I believe what they are saying is that we see design in nature because of the way our minds work (e.g. tendency to ascribe agency to inanimate objections, find patterns in noise, etc). They aren’t saying that ‘all considered, the evidence seems to indicate that nature is the product of design’. Its just our sort of naive, intuitive reaction that leads us to see design, but this is overcome by more careful consideration of all the evidence (like the face on Mars case). Now perhaps you think that there aren’t the sort of powerful countervailing reasons in the case of ascribing design to the universe as there is to rejecting the face on Mars, or perhaps you think that these naive ‘intuitive’ ascriptions of design are more reliable than Dawkins et al give credit. I’m not attempting here to adjudicate those issues. Rather, what I’m saying is that there is a plausible way to understand what Dawkins et al say about the appearance of design without them granting the premise that design actually is the best explanation for the state of the world.

The second major, substantive reason that Robertson advanced as to why he is not an atheist was the familiar one that if atheism were true, then there would be no free will, no good or evil, and no morality. I must confess at this point that I’m not entirely sure if Robertson would accept this characterisation of his position, but I did the best I could to note down his remarks and follow his reasoning – I just found this segment of the evening particularly disjointed. For instance, Robertson clearly expressed his view that determinism and free will are incompatible, but its unclear how this is relevant to atheism because the two (atheism and determinism) are completely independent positions. He did mention this in the context of responding to the problem of evil, however, so perhaps he had not intended that as an actual argument against atheism. Similarly, he clearly seemed to think that without God there would be no good or evil and no morality, but he never explained why. He didn’t mention anything about the various metaethical theories that attempt to account for the nature and origin of morality (most of which make no appeal to God), so its unclear to me what the basis of his objection is. Again, however, perhaps he never intended to offer this as an argument so much as a personal view of his – as I noted before, I found this part hard to follow. Later on in the evening he returned to the issue of morality when he discussed the idea that ‘all humans are equal’, as I discussed above. He argued that according to Christianity, all humans are created in the image of God, and thus are all fundamentally equal, whereas ‘naturalistic materialism’ cannot make any such appeal. Aside from the issues I discussed previously regarding this question, I also just fail to see the logic behind this argument. Suppose Robertson is right and all humans are created ‘in the image of God’. How does it follow that all humans are equal? Some humans could be created more ‘Godlike’ than others, thus negating any equality. I know this isn’t what traditional Christian doctrine says, but if the claim is really ‘Christian doctrine says all humans are equal because they are made in God’s image’, its hard to see how this is actually a compelling argument to anyone who doesn’t already accept such a doctrine. It doesn’t seem to follow from being a theist that all humans are equal, but rather seems to depend on particular theological assumptions that Robertson didn’t really discuss or defend. I also note that ‘naturalistic materialism’ is but a small subset of atheism – Buddhists are atheists but often not naturalistic materialists. As such it would have been good to know more about why Robertson rejects atheism as a whole, and not simply one particular subset of it.

Conclusions

Concluding, I was refreshed and encouraged by some aspects of Robertson’s presentation, in particular his willingness to engage, to share views, to take a more personal approach than ‘here’s a list of twenty reasons to believe’, and to acknowledge that he isn’t in the business of telling people what to believe. At the same time, I was disappointed and frustrated by the undue focus on New Atheism at the expense of engaging with more robust arguments from other atheist or non-religious philosophers, as well as the occasional unsubstantiated claims and poorly-structured arguments. I think these issues are important and typically far too little attention is paid to them in the popular discourse. As such I think its important that, when we do have these opportunities, we should seek to carefully articulate our own views with appropriate nuance, be charitable to opposing views to present them in their strongest form, and in general  stay respectful of those with whom we disagree. Unfortunately I didn’t feel like these virtues were exemplified as well as they could have been in this event.

Note: my quotations from Robertson at the event are based on notes that I took at the time. I believe they accurately reflect the views he presented at the event, however I cannot guarantee they are word-for-word perfect renditions, as I do not have access to a transcript.

A Naturalistic Worldview: Talk Notes

Attached is a link to my slides from a talk I presented at the Humanist Convention in April of 2017 (last week as at the time of posting). They summarise some of my recent thinking about metaphysical naturalism, an argument in defence of which constitutes the majority of the talk. I hope they may be of use and interest to some. Eventually I will get around to writing up my thoughts into a proper article, which I will post on my blog. I anticipate, however, that it will be significantly more technical than these slides, so these may make a good ‘first introduction’ to some of these issues for people with less philosophical background.

A Naturalistic Worldview 2.0, Apr 2017

The Resurrection of Jesus: Explaining the Historical Facts Debate Notes

Synopsis

The following is a lightly edited version of the notes that I compiled in preparation for a debate about the Resurrection of Jesus that was held in April 2016 against Robert Martin. They contain much of the crucial material and arguments in outlining my views on competing explanations for the resurrection, and so I thought I would provide them here for reference. A more detailed and scholarly version of this material, with additional notes, case studies, and references, is contained in my book critiquing the arguments of William Lane Craig, which I hope will be published sometime next year. In the meantime, I hope these will provide a useful reference for those interested in engaging with this important topic.

Opening Remarks

Introduction

My goal here is to outline and defend a naturalistic explanation for certain historical facts related to the death and subsequent appearances of Jesus of Nazareth. I will argue that my proposed explanation, the RHBS model, is superior to the Christian resurrection hypothesis. It is very important to understand that I am not arguing that Jesus didn’t rise from the dead, or that it is irrational to believe that he did. Instead, I am attempting to refute a specific argument for that belief, one commonly raised by Christian apologists such as William Lane Craig, Mike Licona, and Gary Habermas. Other reasons for believing that Jesus rose from the dead, perhaps theological or experiential, or a combination of these with some appeal to the historical evidence, are not addressed by this piece. Here I solely address the question as to whether the historical evidence (and associated arguments and inference derived therefrom) are sufficient to warrant a belief that Jesus rose from the dead. That is, I argue that this ‘resurrection argument’ is not a particularly strong apologetic argument for the Christian faith, irrespective of whether Jesus actually did rise from the dead.

Henceforth I shall accept as historical facts the following events pertaining to the death of Jesus:

  • Jesus was crucified
  • He was buried in a tomb
  • The tomb was found empty by women followers
  • Many of his followers subsequently reported seeing and speaking to Jesus (‘the appearances’)
  • His disciples came to believe that Jesus had been resurrected by God
  • Aspects of these stories and beliefs were passed down and recorded in the gospels (thought not necessarily with all details correct)

I do not believe that denying any of these facts, as so many atheist respondents to this argument do, is a satisfactory or defensible approach. Of these facts, only the empty tomb is subject to any real scholarly dispute, and even that is accepted by many sceptical scholars. Even if they are not all certain, they are at least plausibly true, and thus require an explanation. Nor do I think it is philosophically defensible to a priori reject miracles on the basis of (for instance) the arguments of David Hume. Thus I think it is incumbent upon the atheist to present a plausible (thought not fully comprehensive or perfect) account of these facts. My challenge here, therefore, is to explain how these facts could come to be without divine intervention, and furthermore to argue that in fact these facts can be better accounted for by such a non-miraculous (naturalistic) explanation. In order to do so, I first must discuss what I mean by an ‘explanation’.

Explanations

An explanation consists of a set of propositions which, taken together, entail the facts to be explained. The facts don’t have to follow with deductive certainty, but they should follow with reasonable probability. In the words of philosopher Charles Pierce, given an explanation, the facts to be explained should follow ‘as a matter of course’.

Explanations are judged in accordance with three main criteria, which I will use to compare my naturalistic explanation to the resurrection hypothesis.

  • Explanatory scope: the larger the range of facts that an explanation can account for, the better is that explanation
  • Explanatory power: the more likely the facts are rendered by the explanation, the better and more clearly they are accounted for by it, the better is the explanation
  • Plausibility: the more likely are the propositions posited by the explanation given existing background knowledge (outside of the facts to be explained), the better is the explanation

The RHBS Model

The RHBS model consists of the following key elements:

  1. Reburial: Under one possible scenario, Jesus’ burial in Joseph’s tomb was only ever intended to be temporary, a decision made as a result of the fast approaching Sabbath, the nearness of Joseph’s tomb, and the desire to avoid another disruptive public spectacle. This temporary burial hypothesis is plausible in light of several known facts.
    • Jewish law required bodies to be taken down before evening: (Deuteronomy 21:22) “If a man has committed a sin worthy of death… and you hang him from a tree, his corpse shall not hang all night on the tree, but you shall surely bury him on the same day” (also mentioned in John 19:31 “so that the bodies would not remain on the cross on the Sabbath”)
    • The gospels indicate the burial was rushed: Mark 15:42 Joseph asked for Jesus’ body “When evening had already come, because it was the preparation day, that is, the day before the Sabbath”, and John 19:42 “Therefore because of the Jewish day of preparation, since the tomb was nearby, they laid Jesus there”. That the women came on the Sunday morning to anoint Jesus shows that the burial had not been completed on Friday night
    • Criminals were buried in a different location to ordinary Jews, likely some distance away
    • The Jewish and Roman authorities were concerned about keeping public order, and so wanted Jesus’ burial to be as private as possible
  2. Individual Hallucinations: Following the discovery of the empty tomb, and exacerbated by grief and emotional excitement, one or more of Jesus’ women followers experienced individual hallucinations of the risen Jesus.
    • Hallucinations are common among non-mentally ill: ‘studies of normal populations have found that between 10 and 37% of people report having experienced auditory hallucinations’, “Affective reactions to auditory hallucinations in psychotic, evangelical and control groups”, British Journal of Clinical Psychology
    • Especially common are bereavement hallucinations: ‘half of the subjects felt the presence of the deceased (illusions); about one third reported seeing, hearing and talking to the deceased’,”Bereavement among elderly people: grief reactions, post-bereavement hallucinations and quality of life”, Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica
    • It is well known that hallucinations are extremely common in religious contexts and settings imbued with religious significance
  3. Group Religious Experiences: the women followers then discussed their experiences with the disciples, generating an expectation that they might experience something similar. Partly as a result of this expectancy, and also mediated by social reinforcement and strong emotions, the early disciples had several collective religious experiences of the risen Jesus, thereby accounting for the appearances.
    • This is psychologically known behaviour. Psychologist Donovan H. Rawcliffe wrote “The same factors which operate for a single individual in the induction of hallucinations… may become even more effective in an excited or expectant crowd, and on occasion may result in mass hallucinations. This is not to say that any two people are capable of having precisely the same hallucination identical in every respect. But similar preconceptions and expectations can undoubtedly result in hallucinatory visions so alike that subsequent comparisons would not disclose any major discrepancy… dissimilar hallucinatory experiences often attain a spurious similarity by a process of harmonisation in subsequent recollection and conversation.”
    • Numerous historical cases are known, including the Westall UFO encounter of 1966, when a flying saucer was seen over a school by a large group of hundreds of people, the many Maritain appearances to often thousands of people (such as Our Lady of Zeitoun in Cairo), reports of seeing angels in the trenches (the Angels of Mons), and mass hysteria such as genital shrinking epidemics in Africa and reports of German air raids in Canada during the First World War.
  4. Memory and Cognitive Biases: In the process of discussing these experiences among themselves afterwards, the disciples’ memories of what they experienced were reshaped through processes of reconstructive recall and social memory contagion in the direction of increased coherence between individual accounts, and also greater impressiveness of the experiences. Cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias, and other similar biases combined to reduce any inconsistencies or discrepancies in the accounts or memories.
    • Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus studies the formation of false memories, with an emphasis on the legal system. In a TED talk she narrates the famous case of Steve Titus, whom was accused of rape, the victim declaring at the trial that “I’m absolutely positive that’s the man”. In fact, he was innocent. The real culprit was a serial rapist who later was found and confessed. The victim’s memory had been manipulated by repeated exposure and suggestion of the police officers
    • “Granhag, Stromwall, and Billings (2003) found that 76% of participants came to remember seeing non-existent film footage of the sinking of the passenger liner the Estonia… Similarly, Ost, Hogbin, and Granhag,(2005) found that 40% of participants recalled seeing non-existent CCTV footage of an explosion in a Bali nightclub”, Collaborative recall and collective memory
    • Other studies have found that people incorporate misinformation from others into their own memories of an event (memory contagion), even if they are warned this might occur
  5. Socialization and Marginalisation of Doubt: Public expressions of doubt, disagreement, and skepticism were further muted by forces of socialisation and conformity in the early tightly-knit community. Most of those exposed to these claims had neither the inclination nor the ability to check them for themselves, or question the developing orthodoxy. This accounts for the origin of belief in the resurrection and the writing of the gospels.
    • One example of this would be how Jehovah’s Witness have used social reinforcement of their beliefs and motivated reasoning to survive multiple failed end of world predictions

This explanation has the explanatory scope and power to account for all of the facts. Thus I argue the RHBS model has sufficient explanatory scope to account for all the facts, and is plausible given background knowledge from history, psychology, and sociology. See below for more discussion and examples of some of this evidence.

The Resurrection Hypothesis

Compared to the RHBS model, we find that the resurrection hypothesis as typically stated (“God raised Jesus from the dead”) lacks the explanatory scope and power necessary to account for all of the facts. It does account for the empty tomb, but fails to account for the appearances. Perhaps if any of us were to rise from the dead we would rush to show ourselves to all our friends, but God raising Jesus from the dead is another matter entirely. Unless we have prior knowledge of God’s intentions, it doesn’t follow at all that the disciples (or anyone else) would see the risen Jesus:

  • Jesus could have appeared even if he wasn’t resurrected (as some Gnostics believe)
  • He might have been resurrected without appearing to anyone (per the old copies of Mark)
  • He might have appeared to anyone else, like the Mesoamericans as the Mormons believe

In order to have the explanatory scope to account for all the facts, therefore, the resurrection hypothesis requires three key assumptions:

  • God exists
  • God had a desire or reason to raise Jesus from the dead
  • Jesus had reason to appear to his disciples after being raised to vindicate his divine mission

But each of these assumptions is subject to significant dispute, and none of them are among our widely accepted set of background beliefs. Of course if one already believes that Jesus was divine then they will be very plausible indeed, but this is not among our generally accepted background facts. The fundamental trouble is these assumptions rely on knowledge of God’s intentions, which is something that we do not have access to without making prior theological assumptions. By contrast, the RHBS model relies only on assumptions which can be shown to be plausible given shared background knowledge from history, psychology, and sociology.

Thus, we find that the RHBS model relies on assumptions which are plausible given shared background knowledge from psychology, sociology, and historical scholarship. By contrast, the resurrection hypothesis relies on assumptions whose plausibility is impossible to adjudicate in a non-question begging way. As such, the RBHS model is a superior explanation of the historical facts. This does not necessarily mean that it describes what actually happened, but with respect to identifying an explanatory framework for interpreting the historical facts, I believe it is superior to the resurrection hypothesis.

Rebuttals and Responses

Assumptions of the RBHS model

The RHBS Model requires four main assumptions:

  • Jesus’ body was removed from the tomb before its discovery by Jesus’ women followers
  • Some of Jesus’ followers experienced individual hallucinations of Jesus appearing to them
  • Reports of the empty tomb and these first appearances triggered a serious of collective experiences of the risen Jesus among the disciples
  • The memories and understanding of these experiences were reshaped over time by psychological and sociological forces towards being more consistent and impressive

The resurrection hypothesis is much simpler than the RHBS model

The resurrection hypothesis as typically stated is much simpler: ‘God (bodily) raised Jesus from the dead’. Since the RHBS model is so much more complicated, does not Occam’s Razor say we should prefer the resurrection hypothesis? In fact this is not the case, because Occam’s Razor does not, contrary to how it is often stated, say that ‘simpler explanations are more likely to be true’. Rather, it states that explanations which must make fewer new (previously unestablished) assumptions are to be preferred. Thus it is essentially equivalent to the criterion of plausibility – given our background information, how likely is the proposed explanation?

Joseph of Arimathea had no reason to rebury the body of Jesus

I see two broad possibilities here:

  • Intended temporary storage: Joseph always intended to rebury Jesus, having only placed Jesus’ body in his tomb temporarily, intending a reburial after the Sabbath was over. This may have been done because his tomb was very close to the site of execution, as implied by John 19:42, and as implied by Mark and John the Sabbath was approaching and it was against Jewish law to leave crucified victims out on the Sabbath. Another possibility was that the authorities wanted a quiet, private site to place Jesus’ body for a couple of days until the commotion surrounding his crucifixion had died down, or for both reasons.
  • Change of heart: Joseph may have originally intended to leave Jesus’ body in his family tomb (being perhaps a sympathiser or even secret supporter), however after spending time with family and/or friends over the Sabbath and telling them what he had done, he had second thoughts and was prevailed upon to move the body from his (expensive) family tomb. (I can just imagine Joseph going home and his wife yelling incredulously “you did what with our family tomb!?”) In Jewish burial custom criminals were buried in a separate location to those who received honourable burials, and having Jesus buried in one’s tomb (or even nearby to one’s tomb) would have been considered to be an insult.

If Joseph of Arimathea moved the body, he would have told the disciples about it to refute their claims that Jesus was raised

  1. Not enough information to know this: absolutely nothing is known about Joseph except that he was a member of the council who buried Jesus. We do not know his reasons for doing so (the gospels are not entirely consistent about this, and it is unclear if they can be trusted as many scholars have identified a tendency to progressively ‘christianise’ Joseph). We do now know how connected, if at all, he was to the Christian movement. We do not know if he knew any of the disciples of kept in contact with them (whom it must be remembered were in hiding from the Jewish establishment after the crucifixion). He may have died very shortly after these events, he may have moved away, or simply have not cared enough about figures he may have regarded as radical zealots to attempt to dissuade them of their views.
  2. Disciples would not have been convinced anyway: even if Joseph had made known the reburial to the disciples, I doubt that would have convinced them. In this case, the body would soon have become unrecognisable, and the disciples would likely have suspected a Jewish plot. Even aside from that problem, irrational belief persistence is well documented in new religious movements. As such, I think it possible (though less likely) that Joseph did make known the reburial to the disciples, but they did not believe him and so the incident was accorded no important, never recorded and subsequently forgotten.

Reinterment was against Jewish law

  1. Joseph had a plausible excuse: Joseph may have justified the reburial on the grounds that his tomb was publically known and therefore not safe from tomb robbers. Whether or not this was his actual reason, he could have used this as a plausible justification, as this is an acknowledged exception to the normal Jewish rule against reburying bodies
  2. Mary doesn’t agree: Mary Magdelene also doesn’t seem to think that a reburial is implausible, as in John 20:2 she says “they have taken away the Lord out of the tomb, and we do not know where they have laid Him”.
  3. Parallel cases: Temporary burial is attested in Jewish sources: Semakhot, 13:5 ‘Whosoever finds a corpse in a tomb should not move it from its place, unless he knows that this is a temporary grave’ and ‘Rabbi Simeon ben Eleazar says: Rabban Gamliel had a temporary (borrowed) tomb in Yabneh into which they bring the corpse and lock the door upon it’

If the body had been removed, the Jewish authorities would have produced it to disprove the disciples’ claims

This argument relies on five key premises, each of which I regard as dubious or highly unlikely.

  1. Jews were interested in debate: for this objection to hold, the Jewish authorities must have been sufficiently interested in debating or disproving specific factual claims made by the early Christians. I see no reson to believe that this was the case. The Jewish authorities did not like the Christians making claims they regarded as blasphemous, stirring up trouble among the people, or building up a rival religious power structure. Their activities as recorded in Acts are consistent with these focuses: they persecute, they arrest, they bring to trial, they criticise and forbid from teaching. They make no attempt to persuade or present counter evidence. The original (uninterpolated) Testimonium Flavianum, an early example of Jewish responses to Christianity, does not mention the resurrection: “Now there was about this time Jesus, a wise man. For he was a doer of startling deeds, a teacher of such men as receive the truth with pleasure. And he gained a following both among many Jews and many of Greek origin. And when Pilate, at the suggestion of the principal men amongst us, condemned him to the cross, those that loved him at the first did not forsake him. And the tribe of Christians, so named from him, are not extinct at this day.” As Michael Martin says “This hardly suggests that Jewish leaders were actively engaged in attempting to refute the Resurrection story but failing in their efforts”.
  1. Jews knew where the body was: if the body of Jesus was reburied in a mass grave, or some other unmarked site, or possibly stolen by another third party or misplaced in some other way, there is no reason why the Jewish authorities would have known where it was. It is not at all clear why initially they would have cared what happened to the body or have made any effort to keep tabs on it. That the outcome of the body would be important only became clear weeks later when the disciples began to publically declare the resurrection. By that time the body may have long been lost.
  1. We would have a record of Jews displaying the body: this response assumes that if the Jewish authorities had presented the body of Jesus publically in some way, we would have a record of this fact. We have no records at all about the early Christian movement from first century Jewish authorities whom the Christians were dealing with. We have no critical reports, only a few accounts in Acts and elsewhere about what Christians said was being done to them. If the authorities had presented the body of Jesus, it seems very plausible that this is something Christians (believing it to be faked) would not have recorded. Even if they had, since we have virtually no records at all from this period, there is no reason to suppose that we would written records of this particular occurrence would have survived.
  1. The corpse of Jesus would have been recognisable: Corpses decay quite quickly, especially in the often hot and humid conditions of Palestine. Probably within a few days, or a week or two at most, Jesus’ corpse would not have been recognisable. Thus the Jewish authorities had a very short window in which a corpse could be presented with any chance that the disciples would accept it as Jesus. It seems eminently reasonable to me that, even had they wanted to produce the body and known where it could be found, by the time it could be done it was too late to bother, or too late to make any difference, as the corpse had decaying beyond clear recognition.
  1. Presentation of Jesus’ body would have stopped Christianity: this response assumes that if the disciples had recognised a corpse as that of Jesus, they would have given up their claims, or at least been unable to persuade anyone else of their claims. This assumption runs contrary to the ample evidence we have of the power of irrational belief persistence, particularly in the context of new religious movements. People are perfectly capable of believing things in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. As such, even if the followers of Jesus believed that they corpse they saw was that of Jesus, I believe it is not at all implausible that they would have found some way to rationalise this away, and the event was not recorded and eventually dropped from the Christian narrative. Consider for instance the claim of apologist William Lane Craig: “should a conflict arise between the witness of the Holy Spirit to the fundamental truth of the Christian faith and beliefs based on argument and evidence, then it is the former which must take precedence over the latter, not vice versa”.

The appearance to the 500 cannot be explained naturalistically

  1. The claim is unverifiable: Paul is making a very safe claim. He knew that no one he was speaking to would have the means and inclination to check up his claims. Today misinformation that can be checked using a quick google search keeps on being propagated. To have checked Paul’s claims would have required a lengthy and expensive journey, and then hunting around for the early church and trying to find the, now elderly, remnants of this group. Very few people would have had the means or time to be able to do this.
  2. Witnesses were not in a position to identify Jesus: how did all 500 people know it was Jesus? Were they all close enough to get a good look? Did they all know him when he was alive? This seems unlikely.
  3. Similar cases known: Large appearances like this are documented, including many apparitions of the virgin mary, and moving and drinking statues of the Buddha (see some cases in ‘Additional Material’ section).

Jesus’ followers, or some of them, were sceptical and so did not expect his appearances

  1. Not explained well by resurrection hypothesis: that Jesus’ followers were sceptical is hard to understand given all of the many miracles they are said to have witnessed during Jesus’ life, including healings, exorcisms, raising of the dead, feeding thousands, walk on water, etc. This motif of scepticism in the gospels seems very hard to understand if these miracles had really occurred
  2. Avowel of prior scepticism is a common motif: the RHBS model better explains references to the disciples being sceptical at first since this is a known phenomenon in the psychological literature. Psychologist Anna Stone explains: “the avowal of prior scepticism is a narrative device designed to enhance the credibility of the narrator and the likelihood of attribution of the event to a paranormal cause. The technique works like this: a typical narrative account starts with the avowal of prior scepticism (“at first I was sceptical”), followed by a description of an anomalous occurrence (“but a psychic told me things she could not have known”), which in turn is followed by a conversion (“I realised that something out of the ordinary was occurring”). This technique highlights the strength of evidence that caused a change in the narrator’s attitude from initial scepticism to belief. By highlighting the narrator’s reliance on evidence the account also positions the narrator as a rational thinker”

The disciples would not have come to believe Jesus had been resurrected from mere hallucinations since Jews did not believe in the resurrection of a single person during history, but a general resurrection of all the righteous at the end of history

  1. The logic is the same in both explanations: The proponent of the resurrection hypothesis argues that the disciples came to believe in the resurrection of Jesus because of a combination of his empty tomb and his appearances to them. This is exactly what is proposed in the RHBS model. The only difference is that I argue the empty tomb and the appearances in turn were caused by different factors than the resurrection proponent asserts were at work. But with respect to the belief of the disciples in the resurrection, the logic is essentially identical: empty tomb plus appearances leads to belief in the resurrection.
  2. This exaggerates the degree of change in beliefs: As scholars like Bart Eahrman have argued, the early Christian movement was at least in part an apocalyptic movement. Jesus made numerous statements about the imminent destruction of Jerusalem and the coming of God’s kingdom. Thus when his early followers believed that he had been resurrected, they would not have viewed this as an event in the ‘middle’ of history as we do today, but rather as a further sign of the beginning of the end times. Jesus was described as ‘the firstfruits of them that slept’, indicating that Jesus was but the first of a general resurrection that was to come very soon, when the final end will come. This perspective if further evidenced by the report of the ‘opening of the tombs’ in Matthew, and bodies being raised to life and appearing to many. The disciples thus did not give up their belief that the resurrection was something that would happen at the end of history to everyone. It was only altered a small degree such that Jesus was the ‘firstfruits’ of this general resurrection, with the remainder to follow very shortly at the end of the world. Christians today use similar language in the form of ‘inaugurated eschatology’. Furthermore, we know that the disciples were not ‘typical Jews’, as they followed a reforming figure as Jesus who was widely condemned by the Jewish authorities as a heretic and even a blasphemer. At the very least, we know the disciples were open to innovation and new understandings of their religion.
  3. Religious innovation can occur: A final point is that this argument can be taken to an extreme which would preclude the possibility of any sort of religious innovation. As New Testament scholar Larry Hurtado writes: ‘It is simplistic to regard religious experiences as only derivative from prior beliefs and to fail to see that religious experiences can modify beliefs and/or generate new ones, in some cases resulting in significant innovations… Several decades ago Rodney Stark made similar observations about the capacity of certain “revelational” experiences to generate religious innovations, even “to contradict and challenge prevailing theological ‘truths’,” noting that such innovations can produce “new theologies, eschatological prophecies, or commissions to launch social reforms.”’, L. W. Hurtado, “Revelatory Experiences and Religious Innovation in Earliest Christianity”, The Expository Times.
  4. Other examples of religious innovation: development of new ideas and reconceptualising and rethinking old ones, is common throughout history, and indeed I would argue forms a crucial part of the birth of most new religions. For example, Joseph Smith claimed to have seen a vision of God and Jesus even though he grew up in a Trinitarian environment, Muhammad claimed to receive revelation from the one true god in a polytheistic environment (and though there was some degree of Jewish and Christian presence, neither of these faiths had ‘room’ for a new prophet of God), while the Buddha broke substantially with most of the orthodox tradition of Indian religious thought by rejecting the authority of the Vedas. To say that the disciples of Jesus could not alter or innovate within their existing religious framework is to fly in the face of religious history.

The appearances were too diverse to be accounted for by hallucinations or collective delusory experiences

Exactly how diverse the appearances were depends upon which specific appearance narratives we regard as historical. Certainly I agree that Jesus is reported to have appeared on multiple occasions in group settings, not always in the same location. The same can be said, however, of the appearances to Joseph Smith and his different groups of followers, to Marian apparitions, the miracles of various modern Hindu gurus, and various UFO encounters. Given the psychological and sociological processes at work, there seems to be no reason why group experiences could not have occurred multiple times in varying settings. Absent some specific criteria as to what constitutes ‘too much’ diversity to be accounted for psychologically and why this degree of diversity but no more can be so explained, I see no reason to regard this objection as having any significant force.

Hallucinations don’t occur in groups

In psychology the term ‘hallucination’ is typically used to refer to a sensory perception in the absence of any actual stimulation of the relevant sensory organ. Since perceptions are, at the most fundamental level, private and subjective, hallucinations are generally regarded as being individual phenomena that are not shared between persons or among groups. This, however, is true only of the most rigorous and specific use of the term in psychology. More broadly, it is well documented that large groups of people can and do report experiencing phenomena which clearly did not occur. These aren’t true ‘mass hallucinations’, but they are collective illusory experiences which result in the formation of false beliefs on the basis of experiences shared in groups of people. Some of these I document in the ‘additional material’ below.

Hallucinations don’t eat or hold conversations as did Jesus

  1. Question-begging: this presumes that Jesus actually dead eat or hold conversations with his disciples, which has not been established. All that can be established is that such events are reported in (some) of the gospels. There is no reason why, even if these details are historical, they could not have been aspects of the hallucination and/or later embellishments of memory. Presumably hallucinated aliens don’t abduct people out of buildings, mutilate cattle, or insert anal probes, all of which are reported.
  2. Matthew reports unreliable events: We also know that the gospels contain unreliable details. Matthew’s story of the guard posted at the tomb includes private conversations between Roman officials and Jewish authorities that have no plausible historical source, as well as the Earthquake reported in Matthew 28:2-4.

The guard at the tomb would have prevented any tampering with the body

  1. The guard of the tomb is widely acknowledged to be an apologetic insertion by Matthew
  2. The guard was only set on the Sabbath after Friday night was over, as in Matthew 27:62-64 “Now on the next day, the day after the preparation, the chief priests and the Pharisees gathered together with Pilate, and said, “Sir, we remember that when He was still alive that deceiver said, ‘After three days I am to rise again.’ “Therefore, give orders for the grave to be made secure until the third day, otherwise His disciples may come and steal Him away and say to the people”.
  3. If the guard was set by the Jewish authorities, they would have had the ability to remove the guard when moving the body

Appearance to Thomas the skeptic cannot be explained as a hallucination

This is only reported in John, the latest of the gospels, and seems to have clear apologetic intent. John 20:26-31: “Jesus came, the doors having been shut, and stood in their midst and said, “Peace be with you.”  Then He said to Thomas, “Reach here with your finger, and see My hands; and reach here your hand and put it into My side; and do not be unbelieving, but believing.” Thomas answered and said to Him, “My Lord and my God!” Jesus said to him, “Because you have seen Me, have you believed? Blessed are they who did not see, and yet believed.” Therefore many other signs Jesus also performed in the presence of the disciples, which are not written in this book;  but these have been written so that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing you may have life in His name.”

The appearance to James the brother of Jesus could not be a hallucination as he wasn’t a believer

This reasoning commits the fallacy of post-hoc ergo promptor-hoc, arguing that because one event follows another that therefore it must have been caused by the former. There is no biblical record that James was converted as a result of an appearance. What we have are indications that he wasn’t a believer during part of Jesus’ ministry, and that later on Jesus appeared to him and he became a disciple. We cannot simply infer from this that James became a believer because of this appearance. I think it more likely that be became a follower sometime before his experience, which confirmed and consolidated his faith.

The conversion of Paul cannot be explained naturalistically

  1. I believe that Paul experienced a hallucination which he interpreted as Jesus appearing to him, thereby triggering a gradual conversion transition
  2. This more gradual conversion would explain why he waited so long to visit the disciples in Jerusalem
  3. Paul gives no detailed account of his conversion story. The only detail account is found in Acts, which was written after Paul died (AD 67, Acts written in AD 80s). As such the details of the account must be treated with caution
  4. ‘Evidence is offered to suggest a neurological origin for Paul’s ecstatic visions. Paul’s physical state at the time of his conversion is discussed and related to these ecstatic experiences. It is postulated that both were manifestations of temporal lobe epilepsy’, “St Paul and temporal lobe epilepsy”, J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry , http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/50/6/659.short
  5. “D. Landsborough published an article in the Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, in which he stated that Paul’s conversion experience, with the bright light, loss of normal bodily posture, a message of strong religious content, and his subsequent blindness, suggested ‘an attack of [temporal lobe epilepsy], perhaps ending in a convulsion … The blindness which followed may have been post-ictal’”
  6. We do have other cases of very strange and unusual conversion stories, see list below, so this assumption that Paul had a vision and subsequent conversion is plausible
  7. By contrast, we have no way of adjudicating whether God would wish to appear to someone so disconnected from the historical Jesus as Paul; Paul’s conversion does not follow ‘as a matter of course’ from the other assumptions

Additional Material

Psychology of memory and biases

These various processes would have shaped the disciples’ original experiences of seeing Jesus, their memories of what they had experienced, and led them to understand their experiences in ways that supported existing beliefs and confirmed with the emerging consensus among their peers.

  1. ‘Pentecostal miracles and healings have often been described and interpreted, but rarely explained in their sociological workings. As former research implies, actual biomedical effects of Pentecostal healings are possible (the so-called placebo effect), but quite limited. In Pentecostal healing services, however, very impressive miracles and healings are routinely produced: paralytics arise from wheelchairs, cancerous ulcers disappear, legs grow, cavities are mysteriously filled, and the deaf suddenly hear. Drawing on a case study and qualitative interviews, this paper offers a sociological, mechanism-based, explanatory scheme for the observed phenomena. It is argued that a number of “social techniques” (e.g., suggestion, rhythm, music), context factors (e.g., audience size and beliefs), and causal mechanisms (e.g., probability, latency, selection, and editing effects) are combined in an ingenious way in order to produce miracles and healings’, “All Things Are Possible: Towards a Sociological Explanation of Pentecostal Miracles and Healings”, Sociology of Religion, http://www.unil.ch/webdav/site/issrc/shared/Healing_Final1.pdf
  2. ‘Hauntings and poltergeist-like episodes are argued to be products of contagious reactions to ambiguous environmental or cognitive events. In particular, evidence suggests that the subjective and objective effects reported by percipients are the function of independent, nonparanoraml etiologies whose constitutions have been previously established and described. According to this multivariate model, the labeling of ambiguous events as “abnormal” or “paranormal” initiates the reactive process which is subsequently sustained by perceptual contagion, i.e., flurries of paranormal observations due self-reinforcing attentional processes’, “Hauntings and poltergeist-like episodes as a confluence of conventional phenomena: a general hypothesis”, Perceptual and Motor Skills, http://www.amsciepub.com/doi/abs/10.2466/pms.1996.83.3f.1307
  3. Many people report unusual experiences merely from sitting in a room if they are told to expect them beforehand. ‘Participants were required to spend 50 min in a specially constructed chamber, within which they were exposed to infrasound, complex EMFs, both or neither… A considerable proportion of the participants reported a number of anomalous sensations in response to a fairly mild suggestion that in our white, round, featureless room they might feel some unusual sensations. Such an explanation is in line with the observations of Houran and Lange (1996). They asked two volunteers to keep a diary for 30 days of unusual events of the type that are traditionally associated with hauntings and poltergeists in a residence with no prior history of such activity. As expected, the instructions themselves were sufficient for the volunteers to note, with increasing frequency, anomalous or unusual events presumably simply because the volunteers were now primed to notice… Although many participants reported anomalous sensations of various kinds, the number reported was unrelated to experimental condition but was related to TLS scores. The most parsimonious explanation for our findings is in terms of suggestibility’, “The ‘‘Haunt’’ project: An attempt to build a ‘‘haunted’’ room by manipulating complex electromagnetic fields and infrasound”, Cortex, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18635163
  4. ‘Granhag, Stromwall, and Billings (2003) found that 76% of participants came to remember seeing non-existent film footage of the sinking of the passenger liner the Estonia… Similarly, Ost, Hogbin, and Granhag,(2005) found that 40% of participants recalled seeing non-existent CCTV footage of an explosion in a Bali nightclub, and that the number of false reports increased or decreased in line with confirmatory or disconfirmatory social influence exerted by the confederate. Hence, memory conformity effects can occur for significant and emotional autobiographical events’, “Collaborative recall and collective memory: What happens when we remember together?”, Memory, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658210701811862
  5. ‘Numerous studies have shown that eyewitness testimony for pseudo-psychic demonstrations, such as fake séances and fork bending, may be inaccurate and vulnerable to memory distortion. Wiseman and Morris (1995), for example, have presented evidence suggesting that believers in the paranormal had poorer memories for pseudo-psychic demonstrations (i.e., conjuring tricks) than non-believers. Furthermore, the memory differences between believers and non-believers were particularly marked for information that was crucial to explaining how a particular effect had been achieved. For example, the fact that a key disappeared from view during a metal-bending demonstration was critical because it was at this point that a straight key was switched for a bent key. Believers also tended to rate demonstrations of such pseudo-psychic feats as more paranormal than non-believers’, “Memory Conformity and Paranormal Belief”, http://archived.parapsych.org/papers/56.pdf
  6. ‘In contrast to laboratory free recall (which emphasizes detailed and accurate remembering), conversational retellings depend upon the speaker’s goals, the audience, and the social context more generally. Because memories are frequently retrieved in social contexts, retellings of events are often incomplete or distorted, with consequences for later memory. Selective rehearsal contributes to the memory effects, as does the schema activated during retelling. Retellings can be linked to memory errors observed in domains such as eyewitness testimony and flashbulb memories; in all of these situations, people retell events rather than engage in verbatim remembering’, “Retelling Is Not the Same as Recalling Implications for Memory”, Current Directions in Psychological Science, http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/16/1/16.abstract
  7. ‘Sixty first-year Jagiellonian University students described two important autobiographical events twice. In between the two recall sessions, participants from the experimental group viewed two films. The first was a short televised account of the two events; the second was a corresponding videotaped description of the personal experiences of a young woman. In addition, participants were asked to imagine what she had been talking about. Most of the participants from the experimental group incorporated elements of the woman’s description into their own subsequent accounts. In spite of this, they rated the vividness and the accuracy of their post-test memories as very high’, “Distortion of autobiographical memories”, Applied Cognitive Psychology, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/acp.847/abstract
  8. ‘Participants were shown a crime video and then asked to discuss the video in groups, with some receiving misinformation about the event from their discussion partners. After a one week delay some participants were warned about possible misinformation before all participants provided their own account of the event. Co-witness information was incorporated into participants testimonies, and this effect was not reduced by warnings or source monitoring instructions, suggesting memory change may have occurred’, “Can a witness report hearsay evidence unintentionally? The effects of discussion on eyewitness memory”, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1068316X.2010.510117

Irrational belief persistence

Even if compelling evidence had been presented to the disciples that Jesus hadn’t been resurrected from the dead, I doubt this would have changed their minds. There is ample psychological and historical evidence about the tendency of people (especially in the context of new and charismatic religious movements) to deny very obvious counter-evidence to their beliefs. A review of religious groups which made falsified prophecies, “When Prophecy Fails and Faith Persists: A Theoretical Overview”, Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/nr.1999.3.1.60, found that twelve of the thirteen groups they analysed survived the failure of specific prophecies. Jehovah’s Witness multiple failed end of world predictions are a well known example. Another famous example was the 1844 so-called “Great Disappointment”, following the failed prediction of the Millerites that Jesus would return in that year. There were many attempted justifications and some fell away, but the movement continued and gave rise to the contemporary Seventh Day Adventist church.

One form of rationalisation has been described by religious scholar J Gordon Melton as ‘spiritualisation’:

“The prophesied event is reinterpreted in such a way that what was supposed to have been a visible, verifiable occurrence is seen to have been in reality an invisible, spiritual occurrence. The event occurred as predicted, only on a spiritual level.”

According to Joseph Zygmunt, the response to each of the prophetic failures by Watch Tower Society adherents followed a general pattern:

  • The initial reaction by both rank and file and the movement’s leaders was usually a combination of disappointment and puzzlement.
  • Proselytism declined, but members maintained an attitude of watchful waiting for the predictions to materialize. The doctrinal bases for the prophecies were reexamined and conjectures offered as to why the expected events might have been “delayed”.
  • A fuller realization of the quandary was achieved. The group asserted that the prophecies had, in fact, been partially fulfilled, or that some event of prophetic significance—usually supernatural and hence not open to disconfirmation—had actually transpired on the nominated dates. Belief was sustained that God’s plan was continuing to unfold.
  • Unfulfilled portions of the failed prophecies were projected into the future by issuing re-dated predictions, in association with retrospective reinterpretation of earlier failures.
  • A selective interpretation of emerging historical events as confirmation of the signs of the approaching end. A pessimistic worldview sensitized the group to perceive almost every social disturbance and natural disaster as an indicator of the impending collapse of the earthly system.

Experimental studies also support this:

  1. ‘An accomplice presented three common magician’s tricks, which resembled “psychic” performances, to six introductory psychology classes. In the two classes comprising the Psychic condition, the instructors skeptically introduced the accomplice as an alleged psychic; in the Weak Magic condition, as an amateur magician; in the Strong Magic condition, as an amateur magician who would perform stunts which resembled psychic phenomena, but were really not. Belief was assessed through free-form written response, in the form of feedback to the performer. These instructional sets succeeded in manipulating proportion of occult belief. However, proportion of occult belief was above 50% and far exceeding magic beliefs in each experimental condition, even though, as indicated by a manipulation check, subjects in the Magic conditions heard and understood the instructors’ assertions that the accomplice was a magician who would be faking a psychic performance’, “Occult Belief: Seeing Is Believing”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1386128
  2. ‘A study is reported in which 50 adolescent female high school students were given a chance to commit themselves publicly to a religious belief and were then faced with information which seemed to disconfirm that belief. Consistent with dissonance interpretations of earlier field studies, subjects who both expressed belief and accepted the veracity of the disconfirming information subsequently expressed a significant increase in intensity of belief. This reaction was not found among subjects who either had not expressed initial belief or had not accepted the veracity of the disconfirming information’, “Rational processing or rationalization? The effect of disconfirming information on a stated religious belief”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/32/1/176/
  3. ‘When people are motivated to cling to a belief, they do not feel comfortable with blithely ignoring adverse evidence or simply shutting their ears to anyone who opposes their views. Instead, they engage in more subtle forms of ad hoc reasoning, rationalization, and special pleading to arrive at their desired conclusions and to justify their beliefs to others, e.g., reinterpreting the facts, weighing them against background knowledge, finding some reason to discredit the source, etc. This practice allows them to uphold an ‘illusion of objectivity concerning the manner in which… inferences were derived’, “How convenient! The epistemic rationale of self-validating belief systems”, Philosophical Psychology, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.579420

Examples of collective miracle/paranormal reports

  1. The Allagash Abductions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allagash_Abductions): ‘In August of 1976, four men, brothers Jack and Jim Weiner, and their friends Chuck Rak and Charlie Foltz, went on a camping trip for two weeks in the Allagash Wilderness in Maine. On the second night, Jim noticed a strange bright object in the sky that appeared for about thirty seconds and then vanished. Two days later on August 20, the men decided to go fishing when the bright object appeared again. This time, the object shot out a bright light, which began following the men. The men began paddling back to shore, and the next thing they remembered was being on shore, and the bright light vanishing. The men thought it was strange that the fire that they had set minutes before they went fishing had completely burnt out, suggesting that they had been gone for several hours. The four men spent six more days in the wilderness, but never again saw the bright object. The men told their families and friends about the strange sightings, but nobody believed them. Then, in 1988, Jack and Jim began having strange nightmares about the four men sitting on a bench naked, with great fears. Jim decided to contact UFO researcher Ray Fowler in order to help with the strange nightmares. The four men decided to go under hypnosis and described in frightening detail about how they were abducted and then probed by aliens back in 1976. They each took polygraph examinations and passed. However, skeptics are not certain that their stories are true, and that the strange nightmares and hypnosis were a result of watching movies and TV shows about aliens. However, the four men are certain that what happened to them is real’, http://unsolvedmysteries.wikia.com/wiki/The_Allagash_Abductions
  2. Case at Melbourne Airport: “Mystery illness at Melbourne Airport: toxic poisoning or mass hysteria?”, Robert E Bartholomew, https://www.mja.com.au/journal/2005/183/11/mystery-illness-melbourne-airport-toxic-poisoning-or-mass-hysteria
  3. Simon Kimbangu (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simon_Kimbangu): 20th century African religious leader who claimed to be a special envoy of Christ, and attributed many miracles, including healings and raising the dead. See for example http://www.dacb.org/stories/demrepcongo/kimbangu4_simon.html , http://www.katinkahesselink.net/his/Kimgangu.html (Lebone Lumbu, 2005). See here (http://scholar.google.com.au/scholar?q=Simon+Kimbangu) for earliest sources – unfortunately most of the oldest stuff is in French. See also Britannica source for raising of the dead (http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/317913/Simon-Kimbangu).
  4. Chaitanya Mahaprabhu (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaitanya_Mahaprabhu): 15th century Indian saint with many miracles attributed to them (some described here http://www.dlshq.org/saints/gauranga.htm). There are multiple biographies of him written within a few decades of his death (two main ones are by http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaitanya_Bhagavata and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaitanya_Charitamrita). More sources here http://veda.harekrsna.cz/encyclopedia/parampara2.htm#22. Example: “At Puri a miracle happened. During the car festival, the car of Jagannath did not move. All the pilgrims tried their combined strength. It proved futile. The gigantic elephants of the Raja of Puri also failed to move the car. All were in a stage of suspense and dilemma. Gauranga came just then. He pushed the car by his head and the car moved at once.”
  5. Our Lady of Zeitoun (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeitoun_apparitions): Marian apparition reported in Cairo for several years in the late 1960s. Tens of thousands of people reported seeing the apparitions, including many Muslims and non-Christians. There is plenty of documentation on this, see for example this video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nMEWxRB-1dc.
  6. Bruce T. Grindal (http://scholar.google.com.au/scholar?hl=en&q=Bruce+T.+Grindal=): A respected academic anthropologist who wrote a scholarly account of his experience ‘seeing’ a person raised from the dead in an African ritual. Note that he doesn’t believe the event really happened this way, but that is what he claims to have seen. His paper on the topic is called ‘Into the Heart of Sisala Experience: Witnessing Death Divination’. Also an interesting link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transpersonal_anthropology).
  7. Apollonius of Tyana (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollonius_of_Tyana):  credited with many miracles. We have many written accounts. An excellent outline of the evidence can be found here http://www.livius.org/ap-ark/apollonius/apollonius07.html. Our main source of information is Apollonius’ biographer Philostratus who wrote his Life of Apollonius of Tyana (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life_of_Apollonius_of_Tyana ) between 217 and 238 (about 100-150 years after the event). After 180 AD Lucian wrote a pamphlet where he attacked Alexander of Abonoteichus, a student of one of Apollonius’ students, as a charlatan; and suggested that the whole school was based on fraud. From this we can infer that Apollonius really had students and that his school survived at least until Lucian’s time. More sources here http://www.biblequery.org/History/Legends/ApolloniusOfTyana.htm. Maria Dzielska casts doubt on the historicity of Philostratus’ accounts in her work ‘Apollonius of Tyana in Legend and History’; see http://www.history.snn.gr/apollonius.html.

Examples of strange or unexpected conversions

These can serve as parallel cases in reference to which the conversion of Paul can be better understood.

  1. Michael Sudduth: Why did a Christian philosopher of religion convert to Hinduism?, http://www.newappsblog.com/2012/07/why-did-a-christian-philosopher-of-religion-convert-to-hinduism.html
  2. Arnoud van Doorn: From anti-Islamic film-maker to hajj pilgrim, http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2013/oct/23/arnoud-van-doorn-anti-islamic-convert-hajj
  3. Lord George Gordon: Eighteenth Century British Politician who converted to Judaism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lord_George_Gordon#Conversion_to_Judaism
  4. Ashoka the Great: Indian military conqueror of the second century BC converts to Buddhism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashoka_the_Great#Buddhist_conversion
  5. Yvonne Ridley: British journalist hold captive by the Taliban and later converted to Islam, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yvonne_Ridley
  6. Julian the Apostate: Christian-educated Roman Emperor who reverted to Paganism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_%28emperor. One could argue there may have been political motivations, but it’s not clear that his anti-Christian efforts were really politically advantageous, and seem very unusual given his family background and the trend of all other emperors since Constantine.
  7. Emanuel Swedenborg: Not exactly a conversion, but a strange case of a Swedish philosopher who, in his fifties, began to experience dramatic religious visions and dreams, and thought he was called by God to reform Christianity, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emanuel_Swedenborg

Examples of apparitions of the dead

Reported in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research:

  1. “s 25. In March 1846, the wife and two adult daughters of Dr R., in their home in West Philadelphia, Pa., all saw at the same time an apparition which they instantly and independently recognised as Dr R.’s mother, who had died ten years before. The apparition conformed with a promise made by the old lady before her death, and coincided with the purchase of a house by her son along lines which she had advised. That same evening the ladies related their experience to the Rev. Y. He later told the story to Robert Dale Owen. Mr Owen then secured an account of the story direct from the elder daughter, and afterwards secured confirmation from the mother. The direct accounts from the percipients tallied exactly with the story as it had been told by Mr Y. Both the mother and the daughter re- collected the precise dress of the apparition and their accounts agreed entirely that the apparition had crossed the room, approached a portrait of Dr R., fingered to look at it, recrossed to the door, and inexplicably vanished.”
  2. “s 29. Julia Murray died in Yonkers, N.Y., on 23 March 1901. At about 3 a.m. the next morning, seven relatives and friends (all Catholics) each saw and recognised an apparition of the deceased which came into view near a picture of the Virgin Mary, on the wall of a room next to the one where the body lay. Katie Cain, Rose Kearne and Mrs Corbalis, when interviewed separately, all agreed on the following facts: a wreath or crown (of ‘flowers’, ‘leaves and flowers’, or ‘evergreens’) was on the head; rosary beads hung from the hands, which were crossed on the breast or in a position of prayer, or both successively; the figure wore a robe which ended at the bottom in clouds. Points mentioned by two, but not all three of the percipients interviewed were as follows : The apparition was seen in profile ; the hair was hanging down the back ; the robe was white ; the figure appeared to be solid (or was seen as plainly as in life) ; it faded toward the ceiling, or disappeared slowly through the ceiling. The newspapers made a great sensation about these events. James H. Hyslop heard about it and interviewed Mrs Corbalis on 30 March, and Katie Cain and Rosie Kearns on 5 April 1901, but did not secure signed statements from them.”
  3. Sir George Grey was a British explorer who, in his journey to an aboriginal tribe living North of Perth in 1838, reported an experience whereby he was believed to be the son of one of the aboriginal families reborn as a white man. This belief has been documented by other white explorers who were believed by natives to be dead relatives reborn. Here I quote a passage from Grey’s diary: “After we had tethered the horses and made ourselves tolerably comfortable we heard loud voices from the hills above us… Our guides shouted in return and gradually the approaching cries came nearer and nearer. I was however wholly unprepared for the scene that was about to take place. A sort of procession came up headed by two women down whose cheeks tears were streaming. The eldest of these came up to me and looking for a moment at me said—‘Gwa gwa bundo bal’—‘Yes yes in truth it is him’; and then throwing her arms round me cried bitterly her head resting on my breast… the other younger one knelt at my feet also crying. At last the old lady emboldened by my submission deliberately kissed me on each cheek just in the manner a Frenchwoman would have done; she then cried a little more and at length relieving me assured me that I was the ghost of her son who had some time before been killed by a spear-wound in his breast. The younger female was my sister… My new mother expressed almost as much delight at my return to my family as my real mother would have done had I been unexpectedly restored to her. As soon as she left me my brothers and father (the old man who had previously been so frightened) came up and embraced me after their manner—that is they threw their arms round my waist placed their right knee against my right knee and their breast against my breast holding me in this way for several minutes… This belief that white people are the souls of departed blacks is by no means an uncommon superstition amongst them; they themselves never having an idea of quitting their own land cannot imagine others doing it;—and thus when they see white people suddenly appear in their country and settling themselves down in particular spots they imagine that they must have formed an attachment for this land in some other state of existence; and hence conclude the settlers were at one period black men and their own relations. Likenesses whether real or imagined complete the delusion; and from the manner of the old woman I have just alluded to from her many tears and from her warm caresses I feel firmly convinced that she really believed I was her son whose first thought upon his return to earth had been to re-visit his old mother and bring her a present.”